A MAC layer protocol supporting the application of WSNs in medicine and healthcare domains by Zhang, Zhongwei & Zhou, Hong
A MAC layer protocol supporting the application of WSNs in
medicine and healthcare domains
Zhongwei Zhang
Department of Mathematics and Computing
Faculty of Sciences
University of Southern Queensland
Toowoomba, QLD 4350
Email: zhongwei@usq.edu.au
Hong Zhou
Department of Electronic Engineering
Faculty of Engineering and Surveying
University of Southern Queensland
Toowoomba, QLD 4350
Email: hong.zhou@usq.edu.au
Abstract—Application of Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSN) in many fields has achieved a significant advances,
many research can be seen in military, industrial control
surveillance, and bush fire and wild habitant monitoring,
However, it is a bit too early to claim the application of
WSN in the domain of Medicine and Healthcare (M&HC)
a big success. The major obstacle is the concern raised
by the users that how secure the collected data is stored
or transmitted over the underlying WSN and how to
protect privacy while taking advantage of the technology.
In this paper, a sensible solution is proposed to improve
the security by augmenting the IEEE 802.15.4 standard
with intrusion detection and counterattack mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past years, Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSN) emerged as a promising technology which
has a potential to be adopted in many practical
applications [1], [5]. The primary reason is that
WSNs can penetrate into areas used to be regarded
as dangerous or inaccessible. With advances in sens-
ing technology and wireless networking technology,
the cost of making sensor devices is very low,
the communication overheads incurred in the data
transmitting among the sensor nodes are diminish-
ing considerably. Consequently, the total cost of
creating WSNs could be significantly reduced while
the capacity of WSNs grows larger than that before.
Because of the pervasive nature of sensor devices
and flexibility in topology of networks, WSNs hold
the promise of facilitating processing large quantity
data in realtime.
It envisages that the WSN technology has tremen-
dous potentials of being deployed in the healthcare
industries including hospital and nursing homes,
that usually involve enormous amount of money and
resources, in which many government organisation,
private sectors and communities groups invest [4],
[5]. Many medical services are vital to human
life and the quality of the services are critically
detrimental to the wellbeing of society. There are
many initiatives and a lot of progress have been
made towards the improvement of the quality of
healthcare services.
Despite of many progress made mainly on the
performance of WSNs and efficient application in
data sensitive and real time area, the concerns
with the security and privacy have not been given
sufficient attention. When it comes to medicine
or healthcare domains, the concern with security
issue, particular with privacy, becomes immediate
and inevasible. There are a number of real life
projects and protocols at moment [3], [2]. For exam-
ple, HealthGear is a Microsoft Research project, it
consists of a set of physiological sensors connected
by Bluetooth to a cell phone. In Europe, an initia-
tive called MobiHealth, administrated by European
Commission, utilizes UMTS and GRPS networks.
Other than that, Imperial College London has a
project called Ubimon; while Harvard University in
US works on CodeBlue project. In their projects,
the IEEE 802.15.6 was standardized for wireless
Body Area Networks (WBAN). The MAC layer in
IEEE 802.15.6 is design for short range, wireless
communication in and around the body area.
Since the application of WSNs in M&HC is
likely deployed in hospitals or nursing homes, this
is extremely attractive to adversaries which are
inquisitive to patients private data such as pregnancy
or curious in eavesdropping other peoples health
status such as the psychological symptoms and
chronic illness. To exploit this vulnerability, adver-
saries often launch various attacks in the stage of
sensor communicating each other or data transmit-
ting between sensor nodes and the gateway station
via wireless transmit media. Although the TCP/IP
Internet layer architecture is still mentioned while
developing the communication protocols for WSN,
many research have suggested a cross-layer model
probably more appropriate and the only right choice
for WSNs, especially in considering the constraints
on energy and computational capability. Security
threats exist in other places which are located at
higher layer in the stack of TCP/IP protocol suites.
For instance, Jamming interference is a common
threat in physical layer, whilst a popular routing
protocol, DSR is susceptible to an attack called
neglect and greed.
The reminding of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Section II, the security issue for general
WSN is reviewed, followed by some common se-
curity mechanism currently in use. In Section III,
we mainly focus on the application of WSNs in
medicine and healthcare domains. Apart from the
stringent requirements of energy supply, the com-
putational capacity and communication overheads to
the sensor nodes, the application of WSNs in this
context exerts more strict demand on the protection
of data secrecy and private information. To address
the security issue, we propose to integrate the in-
trusion detection strategy with the IEEE 802.11.4
standard in Section IV. In Section V, we focus
on a secure MAC layer protocol for the applica-
tion of WSN in the context of M&HC. Finally
in Section VI, we conclude the paper by giving a
discussion on the implementation issues, followed
by a list of problems for the future.
II. SECURITY IN WSN
An application of WSNs usually has tens or
hundreds of sensing devices scattered in an area
where the targets are confined. Security issues in
general application of WSNs are closely linked with
these sensor devices. These sensor devices are either
to sense environment or track an event happening
at a specific location. The sensor devices are of
peculiar characteristics such as
• extremely limited in terms of power, computa-
tion, and communication
• often deployed in accessible areas
• dynamic ad hoc topology, multicast transmis-
sion
The security involves protecting a chain of commu-
nication links. The limitation of the WSN devices
require that security measures be integrated into
every components of the application of WSNs.
This requirement makes the WSN subject to the
following.
• key establishment and trust setup
• confidentiality and privacy
• integrity and authentication
• availability
• resilience to node compromise
• secure routing
• secure group management
• data aggregation
The existing security protocol and technology that
have been used in traditional wireless networks are
not necessarily applicable or efficient enough for
WSNs. The major reasons behind could be, but not
limited to the following.
1) it is impossible to prevent the sensor nodes
from being physically accessed by attackers.
This indicates an attacker can read sensor
nodes’ memory or influence the operation of
the node software.
2) The constraints regarding memory and com-
putational capabilities are a serious obstacle
for implementing the traditional security mea-
sures such as cryptographic algorithms.
3) in-network processing is needed to be per-
formed, which means intermediate nodes need
to access and modify the information con-
tained in data packets.
4) The limited energy of sensor nodes opens up
a particularly attractive line of attacks. That is
to say, attackers could have much more energy
than the sensor nodes.
The application of WSNs are also very applica-
tion dependent. It has indicated that the security
measures for one application of WSNs could be
significantly different than that of other applications
of WSNs.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF APPLICATION OF
WSN
Application of WSN in medicine and healthcare
domains has been in demand for long time [1],
it has many significance that can provide high
quality services in the cost effective way, comparing
with traditional healthcare practice. The high quality
services mean the services provided by the WSN are
more accurate and more prompt. The application of
WSN in medicine and healthcare domains focused
on monitoring the health status of patients have
(1) The environment of application of WSN is
hospital and/or nursing homes. It is open, less ,
accessible to various kind of persons
(2) The data transmission technology is wireless,
which is vulnerable to various attacks.
(3) The objects which the application work on are
patients or elderly.
The social implications of the application of WSN
include:
• security, privacy and legal issues
• economic and political issues
Security issues are major concern raised by most
people. Privacy issue or other social implications are
not discussed extensively regarding this field.
For the application of WSNs in the context of
M&HC, there are 5 categories of security threats.
Each threat requires a solution to meet the security
demand.
Category 1: Unauthenticated or unauthorized
access. This threat is often dealt with by using
random key distribution or public key cryptography
to stop adversaries from accessing sensor nodes in
the adjacent area.
Category 2: Message disclosure. This threat is
very damaging in the sense that the data confiden-
tiality and privacy is breached. A possible counter-
measure is to count on the link and network layer
encryption or access control.
Category 3: Message modification. The tradi-
tional solution to this threat is to use secure hash
function or digital signature to protect data integrity
and authenticity. We have some reservations on this
solution in regarding to the sensor nodes constraints.
Category 4: Denial-of-service (DoS). This threat
includes many types of attacks, mainly related to
the availability. They are all called DoS attacks [6],
they could be adversaries attempt to disrupt, subvert,
or destroy a network, could be hardware failures
and software bugs, even resource exhaustion. An in-
trusion detection mechanism is probably a sensible
solution.
Category 5: Intrusion. This threat is kind of high
level attacks. Possible security solution to this type
of attacks include secure group communication and
intrusion detection.
In this paper, we actually describe one solution
based on intrusion detection. In Section IV and V,
we will detail the MAC layer protocol in IEEE
802.15.4 with RTS/CTS mechanism added and a
method of detecting or determining one of three
types of possible intrusion.
IV. MAC LAYER PROTOCOL FOR WSN-M&HC
IEEE 802.15.4 standard was initially designed
for the application of WSN in home automation,
home networking, connecting devices to a PC, home
security and so on. It covers the physical layer and
the MAC layer of a low-rate wireless network. The
physical layer offers bitrate of 20 Kbps using a
single channel in frequency range 868-868.6 MHz.
If it uses 10 channels in the range between 905-
928MHz, the physical layer protocol can offers a
bitrate up to 40 Kbps. Actually it is possible for the
physical layer to offer a bitrate of 250 Kbps when
16 channels in the 2.4 GHz ISM band between 2.4-
2.485 GHz with 5 MHz spacing between the center
frequencies.
The MAC layer protocol of IEEE 802.15.4 com-
bines both schedule based as well as contention
based schemes. The current contention-based MAC
protocol is pretty good in achieving the performance
and efficiency. This MAC layer protocol is called
slotted CSMA-CA protocol. We can easily realize
that the slotted CSMA-CA protocol has no pro-
vision against hidden-terminal problem due to no
RTS/CTS handshake, but it uses random delays to
reduce the probability of collisions. Consequently,
it is desirable to add the RTS/CTS mechanism to
the slotted CSMA-CA protocol.
The slotted CSMA-CA protocol is mainly to
arbitrate sensor nodes to get access to the shared
transmission channel. Figure IV depicts the algo-
rithm used by the slotted CSMA-CA protocol.
BE:= macMinBE
NB:=0 CW:=2
period boundary
Await next backoff
Random delay
backoff periods
random_int(2^BE−1)
backoff period boundary
perform CCA on
channel idle?
BE:=min(BE+1,aMaxBE)
CW:=2
NB:=NB+1
CW=0?
CW:=CW−1
SuccessFailure
NB>MaxCSMABackoffs?
(transmit data packet)
Fig. 1. Slotted CSMA-CA algorithm
V. SECURE SLOTTED MAC PROTOCOL
With the slotted MAC layer protocol, the applica-
tion of WSNs in the context of M&HC is susceptible
to attacks by malicious intruders. Traditional secu-
rity mechanism, such as authentication protocols,
digital signature, and encryption are not sufficient
to prevent the underlying WSN being attacked. For
instance, the Slotted MAC protocol with RTS/CTS
mechanism are vulnerable to collision attack; that is
adversaries lunch attack through sending out some
packets to disrupt the data packets sending process
without being prevented during the exchanging pe-
riod of RTS and CTS packets. Secondly, we could
find out that the slotted MAC protocol is vulnerable
to a kind of attack — unfairness attack. This attack
is due to the characteristics of the RTS/CTS-based
MAC protocols, namely each node has the same
priority to get the common channel and if one node
gets hold of the channel, all other nodes have to wait
for a random length time before trying to transmit
packets. Adversaries could send out packets just
waiting for a very short or without waiting at all.
To improve the safety of the slotted MAC layer
plus the RTS/CTS mechanism, two modules are
added to each node and the modules will be ex-
ecuted automatically all the time. The two mod-
ules are intrusion detection and defense module.
The intrusion detection module meant to determine
whether an intrusion has occurred, and it will trigger
the defense module to stop transmission or receiving
at this time. The approach of stopping transmitting
or receiving is virtually to force the node switch to
sleep mode for a period of time.
Hence the problem has now turned into as right-
fully detection of intrusion by a node. The detection
of intrusion is based on the statistics of four indi-
cators.
• Collision Ration ( Rc ): Rc is the collision
times detected by a node per second.
• Probability of Data Packet Successful Trans-
mission ( Pst ): A successful transmission is
defined as a correct sending and receiving
process of data packet. Pst is the ratio of the
number of successful data packets transmitted
to the total number of data packet transmitted.
• Data Packet’s Waiting-Time ( Tw ): Tw is
the time of data packet in MAC layer buffer
waiting for transmission.
• RTS Packets Arrival ratio ( RRTS ): RRTS is
the number of RTS packets received success-
fully by a node per second.
The intrusion detection module will collect the
statistics of all four indicators, and estimate the
intrusion probabilities for each of them. The prob-
abilities of intrusion are estimated by through a
decision function, which is represented in Eq (1)
y(x) =
1
1 + exp[−A× (x− C)] (1)
Where the decision function y(x) is representing
a curve with two parameters: ‘A’ and ‘C’. They
determine the slop and the center of curve, respec-
tively. The shape of the curve is adjustable and will
be adjusted by changing the parameters ‘A’ and ‘C’.
The intrusion probabilities of three types of at-
tacks are defined as follows:
• Probability of collision attack ( Pc ): Pc is the
probability of collision attack found. It directly
relates to Rc ;
• Probability of exhaustion attack ( Pe ): Pe is
the probability of collision attack found. It
directly relates to RRTS ;
• Probability of unfairness attack ( Pu ): Pu is
the probability of unfairness attack found. It
directly relates to Tw ;
The probability of one kind of intrusion is de-
termined by comparing the combined value of
Pst with one of other three intrusion indicators with
a threshold. For example, to detect a collision attack,
we would compare the combined value of Pt and
Pc with a threshold Pth , ie.
For the detection of collision attack, Eq(2) is sued
as a criteria.
αPt + βPe > Pth (2)
where Pt = 11+exp[−A×(Pst−C)] and Pe =
1
1+exp[−A×(PRTS−C)]
Similarly for the detection of unfairness attacks,
Eq( 3) is the one we have to use.
αPt + βPu > Pth (3)
where Pt is the same as above, and Pu =
1
1+exp[−A×(Tw−C)] and for the detection of exhaustion
attacks, we take Eq(4) as a criteria.
αPt + βPe > Pth (4)
where Pt is the same as above, and Pe =
1
1+exp[−A×(PRST−C)]
Note that α, β are the weights between 0 and 1.
It is quite obvious that in sleep mode or idle
mode, the Rc , Tw , RRTS are much lower
than those in transmitting mode or receiving mode.
Therefore the decision function defined in Eq.(1)
should be adaptive. That means the parameter ‘A’
and ‘C’ in (1) should be varying in different modes.
There are many approaches to determine ‘A’ and
‘C’. In our study, we may adopt an intelligent
approach based on fuzzy logic.
VI. CONCLUSION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) hold the
promise of ubiquitous computing and the applica-
tion of WSNs can be seen in military, environment
monitoring, safety-critical or domestic infrastruc-
tures surveillance. This paper has investigated two
important issues: security in wireless sensor net-
works, particular in the application of WSNs in the
context of M&HC.
The slotted CSMA-CA protocol has been adopted
as the MAC layer protocol in IEEE 802.15.4 stan-
dard by many WSNs. Without the RCS/TCS mech-
anism, the protocol is vulnerable to many attacks
which are very common on the application of WSNs
in medicine and healthcare domain, we proposed
to add the RCS/CTS mechanism onto the slotted
CSMA-CA protocol. In addition, we further inte-
grate the MAC layer protocol with the intrusion de-
tection technology which has defined three criteria
for determining an appropriate attack, and react on
it accordingly.
In the future, we intend to implement the mod-
ified MAC layer protocol combined with the pro-
posed intrusion detection strategy on the application
of WSNs satisfying special requirements from hos-
pitals or nursing homes. The implementation might
be begun on NS2 or a real wireless sensor network
in our sensor network laboratory.
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